Secondly, most of previous attack graphs are designed for a single target, and can not be used to evaluate overall security of networks with several targets. While managing a typical network including multiple critical resources, network administrators would like Corresponding author. To evaluate those resources as a whole rather than reporting each one separately.Thirdly, it is easy to describe outside attackers' threat, but few suggestions have been described to prevent inside malicious attackers from attacking networks. In [8] a new type of attack graph model to detect an intrusion is proposed called as MP (Multiple-prerequisite) attack graphs. Multiple-prerequisite graph (MP graph) is a type of attack graph that has been developed to help defending large scale enterprise network. In this model two stochastic models are mentioned for quantitative security evaluation. These models are constructed based on the use of Markov Decision Process to model the attacker's behaviors. But the problem associated with this model, it is able to evaluate the network security under static conditions only. I.e. there is no any information about the varying conditions of network structure and network content. [9] proposed a solution to this problem by considering the dynamic characteristics of the nodes in the network but it didn't give any analysis about the overhead occurred during this analysis of network security.But the problem associated with this approach, the overhead occurring due to the evaluation of cost for these attacks is increased due to dynamic conditions of network.
To solve the above problem in this paper an efficient network security evaluation is performed on Short-Normalized attack graphs. In this paper, based on the n-valid paths, we present an algorithm to find outthe security risk during finding the total attack paths. Our method can be applicable to practical attack graphs of enterprise networks with thousands of hosts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II gives the information about the attack graph model used in this paper. Section III describes the main problem occurred with some illustrations. Section IV gives the evaluations for valid attack paths and the security risk occurred due to that evaluation. The performance evaluation is discussed in section V with an example. This section also gives the comparison results. Finally conclusions are illustrated in SectionVI.
II. Attack Graph Model
A Short-Normalized attack graph can generally be represented as a directed graph with two types of nodes, exploits and security conditions (or simply conditions). We then formally define Short-Normalized attack graphs as follows: Definition 1: Let AP is a set of atomic propositions, C 0 and C r is a set of initial and reachable conditions, respectively. L: C 0 C r →APis a labeling function of conditions with a true proposition. Let Tbe a set of exploits, and E (T×Cr) (C0 Cr)×T is a set of sides between nodes (conditions or exploits). An attack graph is a tuple AG= (C0 Cr,T,E,L).
To facilitate understanding the attack graph, it is convenient to interpret an attack graph as a simple logic program as follows. Each condition in the attack graph is regarded as a logic variable. The interdependency between exploits and conditions now becomes logic propositions involving the two connectives AND and OR. AND or OR means both or one of the conditions are required by each exploit, respectively. Property 1: For every exploit node τ T, let Pre(τ) be the set of τ's pre-conditions and Post(τ) be the set of itspost-condition, ( L(ci)→L(cj)), where c i Pre(τ),cj Pre(τ),that shows when all the pre-conditions of exploitτ aretrue, the post-conditions of exploit τ will be true. Figure 1 shows a simple example of attack graphs,where C 0 = {c1,c2,c3} , T ={τ 1,τ2,τ3} , C r = {c 4 ,c 5 , c 6 ,c 7 }, C f ={c 7 }. Attackers can arrive at c 5 by theexploit τ 1 and make c 4 true through τ 2 . When the conditions c 5 and c 4 are both true, they further make thecrucial condition c 7 true. Hence, → τ1→ τ2→ τ3 is anattack path to c 7 .
Fig1: A simple example of Attack graph
III. Problem Formulation
By traversing all the possible sequences of exploits to critical resources in the attack graphs, we can obtain all the possible attacks. Hence, attack graphs reveal the potential threats. Attack graphs, however, are often so complex that one user is difficult to comprehend it fully and reach appropriate configuration decisions. It has been demonstrated in the well-known example in the study of attack graphs. In this application example, the attacker's machine is denoted machine 0, and the two victim machines are denoted 1 and 2, respectively. The details of the attack scenario (such as network topology, available services, operating systems, etc.) are not needed here. Figure 2 shows the attack graph for the example. In the figure, exploits are denoted as ovals, and conditions as plain text. Numbers in parenthesis identify associated machines. For example, root(2) meansattackers own root privilege on machine 2, and rsh(2,1)denotes the execution of the rshexploit from machine 2to machine 1. More details can be referred to [3, 4] .
If we focus on the set of the crucial conditions Cf={user(1)}, the sequence of exploits Path1= →host(0) →host(1) is one attack path of Cf, thatshows the attacker can first establish a trust relationshipfrom his machine (host 0) to host 1 (the condition trust(1,0)) . Path2= →host(0)→host(1)→host(1,2)→host(2,1) is also one attack path of Cf. But this attack path has a loop. In realistic attack scenarios, the attacker generally does not choose this attack path for he does not make an effort in owned privilege. Furthermore, although attack graphs lay out all the theoretical attack paths, those attack paths with long distance practically cannot be used by attackers. Hence, we define an-valid attack path as a non-loop attack path with the distance less than n. Further, we desire to answer the following questions. Thus, the second question we should answer is: Question 2: Given the set of crucial conditions Cf, howto measure the security risk of Cf?Removing different vulnerabilities usually incursdifferent costs, and in practice removing all knownvulnerabilities is typically impractical due to lack ofpatches or upgrades and the incurred cost.
IV. Design Approach

A. Computing n-Valid Attack Paths
In this section, we discuss how to obtain all the n-validattack paths used by attacker to compromise the given set of crucial conditions Cf. Theorem 1 follows directly fromthe definitions. Theorem 1Given the constant n and an attack path toCf, Path= → τ1→ τ2→… → τl, l<n. pathis a nvalidattack path if and only if τi(1≤i<l),pre(τi) ( )post(τi))= . In other words, for any exploit τi in an n-valid attackpath, the pre-condition of τi is not the postcondition ofthe succeeding exploits of τi.Through further studying general attack graphs, wefind that there exist some n-valid attack paths, whichindicate the same exploits dependency relation. We canexplain this by Figure  1 , where existing two 4-validattack paths → τ1→ τ2→τ3 and → τ2→ τ1→ τ3. Hence,the exploit τ3 depends on both τ1 and τ2. Nevertheless,there does not exist dependency relation between τ1 andτ2. We consider these attack paths are equivalent to eachother.To obtain all the n-valid attack paths to Cf, we definetwo kinds of sets. Let AG= (C0 Cr,T,E,L) be an attackgraph. For each condition c Cr, letPATHS(c)={Path Path (j) (τ)= → τ1→ τ2→…→τmmeans the jth reachable attack pathto τ=τm.We then consider the interrelations between thereachable attack paths of exploits and conditions. Letc Cr be the reachable condition and τi be the exploitpointing to c, where 1≤i≤m, each reachable attack path ofτiis obviously the reachable attack path of c, thusPATHS(c)=( PATHS( τi)).Let τ T be the exploit and cjbe the condition pointingtoτ, where 1≤i≤n. the reachable attack path of τ ispath→τ, where path PATHS(c1) … PATHS(cn).
B. Measuring Security risk
According to the above discussion, we may use theprocedure obtain_paths(g,n) to compute all the nvalidattack paths to the given set of crucial conditions Cf.. Inthis section, we will measure the security risk of thecrucial conditions Cfusing attack graphs.Let PATHS(Cf) ={Path(i)|1≤i≤m } be all the attackpaths to Cf, the security risk of Cfdepend on three factors.The first is the number of attack paths to Cf, denoted as m,and the more attack paths means there are moreopportunity for attacker to compromise crucial conditions.
The second is the distance of attack path Path(i), denotedas li (li<n), and the longer distance of attack paths impliesthe attacker should have greater endurance to reach theattack goals. The third is the number of kinds of exploitsin PATHS(Cf), denoted as k, and the more kinds ofexploits indicate that attacker needs have moreknowledge on different exploit technologies. Therefore,we define the security risk of Cfas the following formula:
Wherew and 1-w are the weight of the factors forattacker's endurance and knowledge, respectively.
V. Performance Analysis And Experimental Results
To justify our approach to analyzing the network security, we apply the approach to a well-known example in figure 2 .
(1) Computing5-valid attack paths Let Cf={user(2)} and n=5. We use the procedure obtain_pathsto compute all the 5-valid attack paths to Cfshown in the following: Path1= →Ftp_rhost(0,2) →rsh(0,2), Path2= →Ftp_rhost(0,1)→rsh(0,1)→Ftp_rhost(1,2)→rsh(1,2), Path3= →sshd_bof(0,1)→Ftp_rhost(1,2) →rsh(1,2),
(2) Measuring Security Risk
From these attack paths, we know l1=2, l2=4, l3=3, m=3 and k=3 for attacker need have knowledge on Ftp_rhost, rsh and sshd_bof exploit technologies to reach the crucial condition user(1) and user (2) . Supposing w=0.5, we use formula 1 to compute the security risk of {user (2)}, i.e.
Risk=(1/3).5+(1-.5)((1/2)+(1/3)+(1/4))=.71
Thefollowing figures give the complete illustration about the proposed method.
The figure 3 represents the basic node distribution in a random network topology The results presented above illustrates that the proposed method is succeeded in evaluating risk and overhead over attack graphs. The conclusions are mentioned in next section
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, a new approach was proposed to compute non-loop attack paths with the given distance in the Short-Normalized attack graphs. We further present the novel approach to measuring the security risk. The approach can analyze attack graphs for defending network security in polynomial time. The experiments show it is of good scalability for large enterprise networks with thousands of hosts, which have complex ShortNormalized attack graphs. 
